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DRILLING FOR ADMIRALTY: THE OCSLA
AS A BAR TO MARITIME LAW IN OCS
DRILLING ACCIDENTS
CHRISTOPHER W. SANBORN*
ABSTRACT
Maritime law is ultimately driven by commerce. The seas
were—and continue to be—one of the easiest ways to transfer goods
over large distances. Yet maritime commerce has a relative newcomer that is not shipping or transportation focused—offshore
drilling. Should admiralty and maritime law, intended to protect
seamen and keep ships engaged in maritime commerce apply to
personal injury claims on drilling rigs on the Outer Continental
Shelf? This Note argues that they should not apply for two reasons. In Lozman v. Riviera Beach, the Supreme Court announced
that a “vessel” should appear to the reasonable observer as intended to carry a person or things over water. Because a maritime
tort requires a “vessel,” and the Lozman definition thereof suggests
that drilling rigs are not “vessels,” admiralty and maritime law
generally cannot apply to torts on drilling rigs. Moreover, Congress
was explicit in the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act that structures engaged in drilling were to be treated as enclaves of federal
law in some “upland state.” Because the OCSLA is clear that it
intends federal law such as the Long Shore Harbor Worker Compensation Act to apply to drill platform workers, admiralty and the
general maritime law should not apply to drilling-related torts
occurring on such rigs.
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German, Wake Forest University, 2013. I would like to thank my friends and
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INTRODUCTION
In fiscal year 2016, the offshore drilling industry in the
United States was responsible for 315,000 jobs and $30 billion in
the US economy.1 Offshore drilling is a dangerous profession, exposing its workers to both the perils of the sea as well as the
dangers of heavy machinery and drilling for explosive substances
and under extreme pressures; for example, The Bureau of Safety
and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) reported 77 fires, 3 explosions, and 19 gas releases on offshore rigs during calendar year
2018.2 2018 resulted in 171 injuries and 1 fatality, one of the better
years recently reported.3 For employers engaged in this billions
of dollars interest, liability is certainly a big financial concern.4
Congress acted to create a workers’ compensation scheme
on the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS).5 In a rare moment of clarity, Congress passed the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act in
1953, along with a subsequent amendment in 1978.6 The Act
stated that Federal law applies to artificial islands and fixed
structures placed on the OCS for the purpose of resource exploration and collection as if the structure were an area of “Federal
jurisdiction located within a State.”7 In turn, the Longshore and
Harbor Workers Compensation Act (LHWCA) listed drilling work
on an offshore rig as a status and situs for its workers’ compensation scheme.8
BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS ECONOMIC
CONTRIBUTIONS 1, https://www.boem.gov/sites/default/files/oil-and-gas-energy
-program/Leasing/Five-Year-Program/2019-2024/DPP/NP-Economic-Benefits
.pdf [https://perma.cc/6WYR-98NN].
2 Offshore Incident Statistics, BUREAU OF SAFETY & ENV’T ENF’T, https://www
.bsee.gov/stats-facts/offshore-incident-statistics [https://perma.cc/3HD9-FGVR].
3 See id.
4 See generally In re “Deepwater Horizon,” 808 F. Supp. 2d 943 (E.D. La.
2011) (Class action suit involving the explosion, fire, and sinking of the DEEPWATER HORIZON mobile offshore drilling unit, causing the release of millions
of gallons of oil into the Gulf of Mexico).
5 A discussion of the application of state law within three nautical miles (nm)
of the coast is beyond the scope of this Note.
6 See generally Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978, Pub.
L. No. 95-372, § 101 92 Stat. 631 (1978) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. (2018)).
7 Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, Pub. L. No. 83-212, § 4(a)(1) 67 Stat.
642 (1953) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(1) (2018)).
8 43 U.S.C. § 1333(b) (2018).
1
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But the courts have continued to apply admiralty jurisdiction and the general maritime law to workers’ injuries on drilling
rigs, despite the statutory obligation to apply the LHWCA through
the OCSLA.9 The result has been to apply the LHWCA to fixed
platforms, as in those that cannot move under their own propulsion, while allowing the general maritime law and admiralty jurisdiction to apply to self-propelled rigs.10 The courts label those
in this former category as “vessels” under 1 U.S.C. section 3.11
Because such rigs are “vessels,” injured employees may qualify as
“seamen,” meaning they can bring a Jones Act Negligence claim
in a state court for pecuniary and nonpecuniary damages.12
Moreover, the employer may be liable for Maintenance and Cure
as well as an unseaworthiness claim.13
Uncertainty is bad for business.14 Currently, drilling employers and rig owners are subject to two schemes of employee
liability.15 This Note argues that applying the general maritime
law to self-propelled rigs is inappropriate under the OCSLA because Congress made it clear in both the text of the Act and the
legislative history that the general maritime law was not to apply to drilling rigs.16 Moreover, the Note argues that drilling rigs
are not “vessels,” so the courts could simply reject the traditional
trinity of seamen’s tort claims based on the structure not being a
vessel, therefore the claimant cannot be a “seaman.”17
See infra Section II.C.
Compare BW Offshore USA, LLC v. TVT Offshore AS, 145 F. Supp. 3d
658, 662 (E.D. La. 2015) (“Longstanding precedent in this circuit establishes
that mobile offshore drilling units are vessels under general maritime law.”),
with Rodrigue v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 395 U.S. 352, 361 (1969) (“[S]ince the
[OCSLA] provides an alternative federal remedy ... there is no reason to assume that Congress intended to extend those principles to create an admiralty
remedy [on a fixed drilling rig].”).
11 BW Offshore, 145 F. Supp. 3d at 662.
12 Houston Oil & Minerals Corp. v. Am. Int’l Tool Co., 827 F.2d 1049, 1053
(5th Cir. 1987) (“[I]n the area of personal injury, admiralty jurisdiction and
the applicability of maritime law to these Robison-defined special-purpose
watercraft is unassailably established.”).
13 See id. at 1052.
14Business Processes and Risk Management, EK INTERACTIVE, https://ektin
teractive.com/business-processes-risk-management/ [https://perma.cc/QN3B-3L
RK] (last visited Feb. 12, 2021).
15 See infra Part I.
16 See infra Part II.
17 See infra Part II.
9

10
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The Note first discusses the history behind the development of offshore drilling as well as a brief primer on the distinction between admiralty jurisdiction and the general maritime
law.18 The Note then delves into when maritime torts arise and
questions of whether drilling rigs are vessels and the implications for employers that follow therefrom.19 From there, the Note
discusses the OCSLA and Congress’s clear intent to exclude admiralty and the general maritime law.20 Finally, the Note suggests
two approaches to ending the divide: (1) courts could find drilling rigs not to be vessels, or (2) courts begin to apply the OCSLA
as it is written, and acknowledge Congress’s decision to exclude
drilling rigs from admiralty.21
I.ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION AND THE GENERAL MARITIME LAW
A. Federal Common Law
It is important to note that there is a difference between
the general maritime law and admiralty jurisdiction.22 Maritime
law is a self-contained body of substantive law, much like how a
state has its own law separate from its sister states.23 Indeed it
is a body of federal common law, belying the notion that there is
no federal common law.24
Admiralty jurisdiction, like diversity and federal question
jurisdictions, is given to Federal Courts under 28 U.S.C. section
1333.25 A court sitting in admiralty must apply the General Maritime law;26 however, a maritime cause of action does not necessitate admiralty jurisdiction.27 A plaintiff must invoke admiralty
in her pleading under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(h), should
she want access to its unique features such as vessel arrest and
See infra Section I.A.
See infra Sections I.B, I.C.
20 See infra Part II.
21 See infra Part III.
22 See 1 THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW § 4-1, at
146 (3d ed. 2001) [hereinafter SCHOENBAUM, 3d ed.].
23 See id.
24 Id. But see Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (“There is no
federal general common law.”).
25 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (2018); SCHOENBAUM, 3d ed., supra note 22, § 3-1, at 66.
26 SCHOENBAUM, 3d ed., supra note 22, § 3-1, at 166.
27 See id.
18
19
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limitation of liability.28 However, a court sitting in a different
jurisdiction such as diversity must apply the general maritime law
if there is a maritime cause of action.29 Thus, meeting the threshold
of a maritime cause of action is necessary for the application of
the general maritime law and admiralty jurisdiction, but not
sufficient for admiralty jurisdiction.
Related to pleading, admiralty also possesses the unique
“savings to suitors” clause.30 In effect, anyone who wishes to bring
an admiralty claim may bring it either in state court or federal
court.31 Maritime claims are not removable on the basis of admiralty jurisdiction,32 however, they are removable on diversity or
supplemental jurisdiction.33 This in turn creates questions as to
whether the claimant may demand a jury hearing.34 Admiralty
jurisdiction does not allow for a jury.35
1. Maritime Tort and Grubart
Maritime tort is a body of law of a different origin from that
of conventional common law tort.36 The general maritime law has
developed separately from land-based law,37 so much so that
maritime negligence developed under a different set of cases from
standard negligence.38
FED. R. CIV. P. 9(h). See generally FED. R. CIV. P. SUPP. A.
Gibbs ex rel. Gibbs v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 314 F.3d 125, 132 (3d Cir.
2002); SCHOENBAUM, 3d ed., supra note 22, § 4-3, at 156 (“[T]he general maritime law, when in conflict with state law, is supreme.”).
30 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (“Any civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving
to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled.”).
31 THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW: HORNBOOK
SERIES § 2-4, at 109 (5th ed. & Suppl. 2012).
32 Id. at 113.
33 Id. at 111.
34 Id. at 926.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 117.
37 See 1 ROBERT FORCE & MARTIN J. NORRIS, THE LAW OF SEAMEN § 1:4, at
1–8 (5th ed. & Supp. 2018–2019) (“[T]he Constitution has been interpreted as
conferring authority in both Congress and the courts sitting in admiralty to
formulate substantive rules to be applied in cases that fall within admiralty
jurisdiction.”); SCHOENBAUM, supra note 31, § 3-2, at 119 (“[In Leathers v.
Blessing, 105 U.S. 626 (1882),] the Supreme Court recognized the maritime
tort of negligence which exists as a counterpart to state law negligence.”).
38 Id.
28
29
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Regardless of whether an action is brought under admiralty
jurisdiction,39 to be “maritime” the tort must “sound[ ] in admiralty.”40 This is more than simply occurring on navigable waters.41 The current test to determine a maritime tort, as elaborated
in Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., is a
two-prong test.42 The claim must (1) occur on navigable waters;
and (2) have a nexus to traditional maritime activity (TMA).43 The
second prong has two subparts: (a) does the event affect maritime commerce; and (b) is the activity a TMA.44
The second prong and its subparts are often the subjects
of argument.45 The Grubart court stressed that simply occurring
over water does not make an activity a TMA.46 The character of
the event must be maritime.47 The circuits have been left to their
own devices to determine what activities have a sufficiently maritime character to be a TMA, occasionally skirting around the
Grubart court’s examples.48 In general, the courts have read in a
“vessel” requirement to the TMA, as in the harm must occur on
a vessel.49
See supra text accompanying notes 25–29.
Gibbs ex rel. Gibbs v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 314 F.3d 125, 131 (3d Cir. 2002).
41 Id. at 131–32 (citing Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge &
Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 534 (1995)). Historically, simply occurring on navigable waters was sufficient for a claim to be maritime in nature. See Hough v.
Western Transp. Co. (The Plymouth), 70 U.S. 20, 36 (1865) (“Every species of
tort, however occurring, and whether on board a vessel or not, if upon the
high seas or navigable water, is of admiralty cognizance.”).
42 Grubart, 513 U.S. at 534.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 See id. at 532–34 (recounting the history of disputes and precedential
opinions concerning the evolution of the nexus prong).
46 Id. at 541 (describing the malfunction of a washer/drier aboard a vessel
in Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358 (1990), as “hardly maritime”).
47 See id. at 538 (stating that the event must be described as an “intermediate level of possible generality”); see also Germain v. Ficarra, 824 F.3d 258, 272
(2d Cir. 2016) (applying an intermediate level of possible generality by describing
an accident in which the plaintiff jumped from the boat and hit his head on a rock
as an “injury to a passenger who jumped from a vessel on open navigable waters”).
48 Compare Grubart, 513 U.S. at 541 (describing onboard washer/drier
malfunction as “hardly maritime”), with Fedorczyk v. Caribbean Cruise Lines
Ltd., 82 F.3d 69, 73 (3d Cir. 1996) (finding that a slip-and-fall in a cruise ship
shower is a TMA).
49 De La Rosa v. St. Charles Gaming Co., 474 F.3d 185, 187 (5th Cir. 2006)
(holding that a moored riverboat casino was not a “vessel”); see also Monica
39
40
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Despite the requirement of a vessel, a maritime tort may
occur on land.50 Congress passed the Admiralty Extension Act
(AEA) in 1948.51 The AEA extends admiralty to any case or
damage “caused by a vessel on navigable water,” even if the damage
occurred on land.52 While the intent was to extend admiralty jurisdiction, it applies to Grubart and the substantive maritime
tort analysis as well.53
In the context of the outer continental shelf, the Fifth Circuit holds offshore drilling activities to not be a TMA stating,
“[i]ndeed, observing that the Court had previously ‘held that
drilling platforms are not within admiralty jurisdiction,’ we indicated that drilling platforms were not even suggestive of traditional maritime affairs.”54 Thus tort claims on fixed rigs cannot
be brought under the general maritime law through simply occurring on navigable water because they cannot satisfy the nexus
requirement’s TMA subpart.55
The statute and case law demonstrate that under the language of the act, a “vessel” must cause the tort in order to be
maritime.56 Thus if a harm occurs on an apparatus that is considered, in effect, a piece of land, in order for the general maritime law and admiralty jurisdiction to apply, there must be a vessel
causing the harm under Grubart.57 Therefore, if a drilling rig is
Thoele, Note, Throwing Admiralty Jurisdiction A Lifevest: Preserving Jurisdiction
for Maritime Torts That Do Not Involve Vessels, 55 B.C. L. REV. 979, 994–95
(2014) (arguing that Grubart does not contain an explicit “vessel” requirement
and that lower courts have drifted by incorporating such a requirement).
50 Grubart, 513 U.S. at 535–36.
51 THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW: HORNBOOK
SERIES § 1-4, at 20 (3d ed. & Suppl. 2001).
52 46 U.S.C. § 30101(a) (2018); Grubart, 513 U.S. at 532.
53 See Grubart, 513 U.S. at 535–36; De La Rosa v. St. Charles Gaming Co.,
474 F.3d 185, 187 (5th Cir. 2006) (holding a non-vessel casino boat causing harm
on land did not meet the Grubart nexus test thus the tort was not maritime).
54 Herb’s Welding, Inc. v. Gray, 470 U.S. 414, 422 (1985). The platform in
question was fixed. The court based its logic on Congressional intent via the
OCSLA. Id.
55 See id.; see also Grubart, 513 U.S. at 534. Naturally this excludes allision scenarios with a vessel, which would qualify under the AEA. See 46 U.S.C.
§ 30101(a) (2018).
56 Id.; Grubart, 513 U.S. at 535–36; De La Rosa, 474 F.3d at 187.
57 § 30101(a); Grubart, 513 U.S. at 535–36; De La Rosa, 474 F.3d at 187.
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not a “vessel,” the only foreseeable way for a maritime tort to arise
under Grubart is an allusion.58 Yet the question remains whether
such a tort would be maritime if the rig in question is a “vessel.”59
B. What Is a Vessel?
Congress has defined a “vessel” as “every description of
watercraft or other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on water.”60 Historically,
this resulted in a very broad test, that would have included
“three men in a tub” and “Jonah inside the whale” as vessels.61
But things changed in 2013 with Lozman v. Riviera Beach.62
Fane Lozman, the owner of a floating home in South Florida,
docked his home in Riviera Beach.63 Lozman’s home was not a
traditional houseboat; it was a traditional home built upon a
barge.64 It had little resemblance to a boat or ship.65 After disputes
between Lozman and the town concerning Lozman’s change of
residence to the town’s marina, the town attempted to recoup
docking fees and seek trespass damages by seizing the home as
a “vessel” under supplemental admiralty rule C, eventually destroying the home.66 The lower courts found Lozman’s home to be
a “vessel.”67 But the Supreme Court reversed.68 The Court clarified that the test for a “vessel” is whether “a reasonable observer,
looking to the [craft’s] physical characteristics and activities, would
See § 30101(a).
See generally Sanchez v. Enter. Offshore Drilling LLC, 376 F. Supp. 3d
726 (S.D. Tex. 2019) (personal injury suit arising from employee’s injury
while working on a drilling rig).
60 1 U.S.C. § 3 (2018).
61 Burks v. Am. River Transp. Co., 679 F.2d 69, 75 (5th Cir. 1982).
62 Lozman v. Riviera Beach, 568 U.S. 115, 121 (2013). See generally David
W. Robertson & Michael F. Sturley, Vessel Status in Maritime Law: Does
Lozman Set A New Course?, 44 J. MAR. L. & COM. 393 (2013).
63 Lozman, 568 U.S. at 118.
64 “The home consisted of a house-like plywood structure with French doors
on three sides. It contained a sitting room, bedroom, closet, bathroom, and kitchen,
along with a stairway leading to a second level with office space. An empty
bilge space underneath the main floor kept it afloat.” Id. (citations omitted).
65 Id. at 122 (noting the lack of watertight portholes).
66 Id. at 118–20.
67 Id. at 119.
68 Id. at 131.
58
59
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consider it designed to a practical degree for carrying people or
things over water.”69 The Court stressed the practical ability to
carry people over water, distinguishing it from the mere theoretical ability to do so.70
The Court rejected previous broad tests, which could be
simply be described as an “if it floats” test.71 In determining that
Lozman’s floating home was not a vessel, the Court considered
factors including propulsion, ease, and frequency of moving the
craft, ability to carry persons or cargo over water.72 The Court
even found the non-ship-like nature of the home in its analysis
stating, “[the home’s] small rooms looked like ordinary nonmaritime living quarters. And those inside those rooms looked out
upon the world, not through watertight portholes, but through
French doors or ordinary windows.”73 The Court also rejected an
argument that the home was actually used for transportation,
noting that Lozman moved the home far too infrequently.74
Lozman’s legacy is a wholly objective test.75 It does not
matter if the craft’s designer intended for the craft to be a “vessel.”76 The question is whether a reasonable observer would look
at the features of the craft and decide that the vessel was designed for the purpose of waterborne transportation, not merely
theoretically capable of performing such tasks.77
Id. at 118.
Id. at 121.
71 Id. at 120–21.
72 Id. at 130. The Court also noted,
But for the fact that it floats, nothing about Lozman’s home suggests that it was designed to any practical degree to transport
persons or things over water. It had no rudder or other steering mechanism. Its hull was unraked and it had a rectangular
bottom 10 inches below the water. It had no special capacity
to generate or store electricity but could obtain that utility only
through ongoing connections with the land.
Id. at 121–22.
73 Id. at 121.
74 Id. at 130–31.
75 David R. Maass, If It Looks Like a Vessel: The Supreme Court’s “Reasonable Observer” Test for Vessel Status, 65 FLA. L. REV. 895, 896 (2013); see
Lozman, 568 U.S. at 128.
76 See Maass, supra note 75, at 904; see also Lozman, 568 U.S. at 121, 127–28.
77 See Lozman, 568 U.S. at 128.
69
70
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1. “Vessel” Status of Different Types of Drilling Rigs
There are multiple types of drilling rigs in use today.78 They
can be broken into two families, self-propelled and fixed.79 Fixed
rigs can be split further into permanently attached and floating
rig categories.80 Permanently attached rigs are connected to the
seafloor by stilts, piling, or some other permanent structure.81
Appropriately, they are never classified as vessels and have even
been referred to as “artificial islands” by the Supreme Court.82
Floating fixed rigs are towed to a location where they are
then moored to the seafloor for drilling operations.83 Two oil rigs
of this type are Spars and Tension Leg Platforms (TLP).84 Spars
are a large cylinder that extends deep into the water, but not to the
bottom.85 They are attached to the bottom by an intricate system
of cables.86 Similarly, TLPs are attached to the bottom via cables
and an apparatus known as a “tension leg.”87 Spars and TLPs have
been considered not to be “vessels.”88 Indeed, these types of rigs
See generally Kabir Sadeghi, An Overview of Design, Analysis, Construction and Installation of Offshore Petroleum Platforms Suitable for Cyprus Oil/Gas
Fields, 2 GAU J. SOC. & APPL. SCI. 1, 1–7 (2007). While this article is oriented
towards the Mediterranean Sea, the same type of rigs are used in the United
States. See Identifying the Various Types of Drilling Rigs Available for Sale,
HENDERSON RIGS & EQUIP., LLC (Jan. 19, 2017), https://hendersonrigs.com
/identifying-various-types-drilling-rigs-available-sale/ [https://perma.cc/EKF5
-CXLN] (listing various types of rigs available for sale in the United States).
79 See Sadeghi, supra note 78, at 1–7.
80 See id.
81 See id. at 4–7.
82 Rodrigue v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 395 U.S. 352, 360 (1969). It should be
noted that a fixed structure that functions “in aid to navigation” avoids the
vessel question for admiralty purposes—it is automatically allowed in admiralty; however, this is limited to actual “aids to navigation,” i.e., channel markers,
light towers, and other structures attached to the seafloor intended to aid ships
in navigating. See id.
83 See Sadeghi, supra note 78, at 1–3, 5.
84 See id. at 6–7.
85 Id. at 7.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 6.
88 Baker v. Dir., Off. of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 834 F.3d 542, 547–48
(5th Cir. 2016) (holding a TLP was not a vessel by applying the Lozman test);
Hefren v. McDermott, Inc., 820 F.3d 767, 770 (5th Cir. 2016) (stating Spars
are not vessels); Ross v. W&T Offshore, Inc., 357 F. Supp. 3d 554, 563 (E.D.
78
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are akin to fixed platforms because their intricate mooring systems
make it difficult to move them without thorough planning.89
For the above-discussed rig types, courts have applied
Lozman to demonstrate that they are not “vessels.”90 But the courts
have refused to apply Lozman to self-propelled rigs, instead deferring to pre-Lozman precedent.91 The two main rigs in this group
are semi-submersibles and jack-up rigs.92
Semi-submersibles look like traditional fixed rigs from above,
but they float, staying in place by use of anchors and onboard
engines. Moreover, they have a pontoon system to sink deep in
the water to steady the rig.93 The Deepwater Horizon was this type
of rig.94 They look nothing like what a reasonable person may
consider intended to “carr[y] people or things over the water”
upon observation.95 The Eastern District of Louisiana ignored
the issue in 2015 in BW Offshore USA, LLC, simply stating that
“[l]ong-standing precedent” established that mobile drilling rigs
are vessels without addressing the Lozman reasonable observer
analysis.96 Unfortunately, the Fifth Circuit and her sister circuits
La. 2018) (“The [spar] has never been used as a form of transportation as it is
physically incapable of movement. The structure does not have a propulsion
system or any other means of moving from itself from one location to another.
Thus, it is both practically and theoretically incapable of movement.”).
89 See Hefren, 820 F.3d at 770 (“[T]he Fifth Circuit ... ha[s] held that fixed,
offshore platforms permanently affixed to the sea floor were immovable property and that spars were akin to offshore platforms.”).
90 Baker, 834 F.3d at 547; Warrior Energy Servs. Corp. v. ATP Titan M/V,
551 Fed. Appx. 749, 751–52 (2015) (holding a spar to be a “non-vessel” under
Lozman); see also Ross, 357 F. Supp. 3d at 563.
91 BW Offshore USA, LLC v. TVT Offshore AS, 145 F. Supp. 3d 658, 662
(E.D. La. 2015) (“Longstanding precedent in this circuit establishes that mobile offshore drilling units are vessels under general maritime law.”).
92 Sadeghi, supra note 78, at 3.
93 Id.
94 Deepwater Horizon, TRANSOCEAN, https://www.scribd.com/document/162
405643/Deepwater-Horizon-Spec-Sheet (last visited Feb. 12, 2021) (Spec-sheet
for Deepwater Horizon).
95 Lozman v. Riviera Beach, 568 U.S. 115, 132–33 (2013).
96 BW Offshore, 145 F. Supp. 3d at 662. The court merely recited the Lozman
test. Instead of applying the two-year-old test, the court deferred to longstanding precedent. Id.; see also Sanchez v. Enter. Offshore Drilling LLC, 376
F. Supp. 3d 726, 731 (S.D. Tex. 2019) (stating jack-up drilling platforms are
vessels by citing previous, pre-Lozman Fifth Circuit cases and not analyzing
Lozman), rev’d and remanded on other grounds, 970 F.3d 550 (5th Cir. 2020).
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have not had the opportunity to fully address the question further,97 but the silence on the issue is noteworthy.
Jack-up rigs are a sort of hybrid between floating and
fixed rigs.98 They are quite boatlike, able to move under their own
power until they are jacked-up on stilts during drilling operations.99
The Fifth Circuit has long considered them to be “vessels.”100
C. Seamen, Longshore and Harbor Workers, and Tort
“Vessel” status is an important designation for admiralty.101
For employers and employees, it is the difference between a predictable worker’s compensation scheme and unpredictable litigation.102 The reason for the importance of the “vessel” designation
is the related concept of “seaman” status.103
A “seaman” is an employment status designation that brings
with it certain legal rights.104 The designation depends on a work
relationship to a legal “vessel.”105 To qualify as a “seaman,” “an employee’s duties must contribute to the function of the vessel or to the
accomplishment of its mission [and] a seaman must have a connection to a vessel in navigation (or to an identifiable group of such
vessels) that is substantial in terms of both duration and nature.”106
Thus a “vessel” designation is necessary for seaman status
and Jones Act actions.107 If a structure related to the employee’s
work is not a “vessel,” then the employee is not a “seaman.”108
THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW: HORNBOOK
SERIES § 1-7, at 47 n.325 (6th ed. 2019) [hereinafter SCHOENBAUM, 6th ed.].
98 See BW Offshore, 145 F. Supp. 3d at 663.
99 Id.
100 Demette v. Falcon Drilling Co., 280 F.3d 492, 498 n.18 (5th Cir. 2002).
101 See, e.g., BW Offshore, 145 F. Supp. 3d at 662 (affirming that to apply
maritime law, courts must first establish whether something at sea is a vessel).
102 SCHOENBAUM, 6th ed., supra note 97, § 4-1, at 198.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 See Becker v. Tidewater, Inc., 335 F.3d 376, 387–88 (5th Cir. 2003).
106 Id. at 387 (quoting Chandris v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 368 (1995)) (emphasis added).
107 Cain v. Transocean Offshore USA, Inc., 518 F.3d 295, 298 (5th Cir. 2008)
(“The existence of a ‘vessel’ is thus crucial to determining seaman status under
the Jones Act.”).
108 See id.
97
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Accordingly, such an employee would not have access to traditional tort remedies available to “seamen,” such as Jones Act
Negligence.109
Seamen have long been considered the “wards of admiralty”
and have been afforded a special position in its jurisprudence.110
Seamen have three causes of action against their employer: (1)
Jones Act Negligence; (2) Unseaworthiness; and (3) Maintenance
and Cure.111 Unseaworthiness and Maintenance and Cure are
traditional General Maritime Law causes of action.112
1. Unseaworthiness and Maintenance & Cure
A vessel is seaworthy if it is “fit for [its] intended uses.”113
The vessel owner and employer114 have a duty to provide a seaworthy vessel to her seamen.115 It is clearly a claim that requires
a vessel and its condition to cause the harm.116 Without a vessel
there is no claim for unseaworthiness.117 Upon showing breach
and causation, a seaman may receive pecuniary damages that
generally mirror those available under the Jones Act.118
A “seaman” who is harmed in the line of work may also
receive maintenance and cure.119 This effectively covers hospital
See id.
Atlantic Sounding Co., Inc. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404, 417 (2009). But
see Dutra Grp. v. Batterton, 139 S. Ct. 2275, 2287 (2019) (stating that seamen no
longer have a special place in admiralty in holding that punitive damages are
not available in unseaworthiness claims).
111 SCHOENBAUM, 6th ed., supra note 97, § 4-1, at 198.
112 See The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 175 (1903).
113 Drapela v. United States, 419 Fed. Appx. 500, 502 (5th Cir. 2011); see
Usner v. Luckenbach Overseas Corp., 400 U.S. 494, 499 (1971).
114 This is a distinction that goes beyond the scope of this Note. The owner and
employer are often different entities. There is a complex system of “chartering”
in which an owner may effectively lease out her vessel to a time charterer who
will crew the ship acting as an employer. See generally 2 THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM,
ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW § 11-1 (3d ed. 2001).
115 See Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 548 (1960); The Osceola,
189 U.S. at 175.
116 See Mitchell, 362 U.S. at 548; The Osceola, 189 U.S. at 175.
117 See Mitchell, 362 U.S. at 547–48; The Osceola, 189 U.S. at 175.
118 SCHOENBAUM, 6th ed., supra note 97, § 4-10, at 232; see infra note 128
and accompanying text.
119 See SCHOENBAUM, 6th ed., supra note 97, § 4-19, at 280–81.
109
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costs until “maximum cure”—the best available medical result—
and a daily allowance for the duration of the voyage.120 The “seaman” is also entitled to their wages for the rest of the voyage.121
A “seaman” may collect punitive damages for willful nonpayment of
Maintenance and Cure.122
2. Jones Act Negligence
Historically, seamen were not able to sue their employers,
masters, or fellow seamen for negligence.123 In reaction to the
holding in The Osceola, Congress created the Jones Act.124 The
Act created a negligence cause of action for seamen against employers, coworkers, and masters.125 Not only do seamen now
have access to a negligence cause of action in addition to claims
for unseaworthiness and maintenance and cure, but Jones Act
negligence may carry a negligence standard lighter than that of
land-based negligence.126
The importance of the Jones Act claim for an employer is
threefold. First, a Jones Act claim is a negligence claim.127 That
Id. at 280–81.
Id. at 281.
122 Id. § 4-25, at 299.
123 The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 175 (1903). The Court put forth four propositions about a seaman’s possible causes of action. Id. Propositions three and four
held that a seaman cannot sue his “fellow servants” in negligence and could only
recover maintenance and cure for injuries received through negligence. Id.
124 SCHOENBAUM, 3d ed., supra note 22, § 6-20, at 317. Congress disagreed
strongly with the third and fourth propositions in The Osceola Court’s opinion.
Id. The Act was based substantially upon the Federal Employers’ Liability Act
(FELA). Id. § 6-21, at 322.
125 Id. § 6-21, at 322.
126 Id. at 329. There is a debate as to the standard of care required for Jones
Act Negligence Claims. Id. Some jurisdictions advocate for a “slight negligence”
while others consider the standard to be “ordinary negligence.” Id. at 330. This
distinction goes beyond the purpose of this Note, however the Fifth and Ninth
Circuits—the two Circuits with the most drilling-related cases—have split on
this issue with the Fifth Circuit adopting an “ordinary negligence standard.”
Compare Gautreaux v. Scurlock Marine, Inc., 107 F.3d 331 (5th Cir. 1997)
(“The reasonable person standard, therefore, and a Jones Act negligence action
becomes one of the reasonable seaman in like circumstances”), with Havens v.
F/T Polar Mist, 996 F.2d 215, 218 (9th Cir. 1993) (“[E]ven the slightest negligence is sufficient to sustain a finding of liability.”).
127 See SCHOENBAUM, 3d ed., supra note 22, § 6-21, at 322.
120
121
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means the claimant may be able to win damages similar to those in
a normal negligence trial, such as loss of earnings and future earning potential; pain and suffering; and mental anguish.128 This is
exacerbated by the second feature of a Jones Act claim—that the
plaintiff may demand a jury.129 If it seems it cannot get any worse
for a Jones Act defendant, it can: Jones Act claims are nonremovable even if there is a non-admiralty basis of jurisdiction.130 Moreover, a Jones Act claim does not preclude claims for unseaworthiness
or maintenance and cure, meaning they can go before a jury as
well.131 Thus the Jones Act defendant may be required to defend
in a biased forum against a jury.132 Imagine BP or Transocean
defending a Jones Act claim in front of a jury in a Plaquemines
Parish, Louisiana, State Courthouse; the Jones Act makes that
possible, at least for claims arising on self-propelled rigs.133
3. Longshore and Harbor Workers
What of stevedores, maintenance people, and other harbor
workers? Non-“seamen” do not have access to the Jones Act nor
the other general maritime law remedies for seamen.134 Congress
acted to help harbor workers135 following the result of Southern
Pacific Co. v. Jensen,136 in which the Supreme Court found that
the family of a stevedore who died in an accident while loading a
ship, did not have access to a maritime remedy, nor the state workers’ compensation act.137 Congress responded with the Longshore
SCHOENBAUM, 6th ed., supra note 97, § 4-10, at 232–33. See generally
id. § 4-10.
129 Id. § 4-12, at 245.
130 Id.
131 Id. at 247.
132 Id. at 245–46 (discussing various jurisdictional options plaintiff has and
limited options of defendant).
133 See id.; see also BW Offshore USA, LLC v. TVT Offshore AS, 145 F. Supp.
3d 658, 662 (E.D. La. 2015) (“Longstanding precedent in this circuit establishes that mobile offshore drilling units are vessels ....”).
134 FORCE & NORRIS, supra note 37, § 2:1, at 2–3.
135 See 1 ROBERT FORCE & MARTIN J. NORRIS, THE LAW OF MARITIME
PERSONAL INJURIES § 2:3, at 2–8 (5th ed. & Supp. 2018–2019) [hereinafter
FORCE & NORRIS, MARITIME PERSONAL INJURIES].
136 Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
137 FORCE & NORRIS, MARITIME PERSONAL INJURIES, supra note 135, § 2:3,
at 7–8.
128
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and Harbor Workers Compensation Act.138 The LHWCA more or
less borrowed New York’s Workers Compensation statute, applying
it to those who worked in the maritime field ashore.139 Congress
legislatively extended the LHWCA to include OCS workers with
the OCSLA.140 Therefore, the LHWCA is a remedy included in
the OCSLA.141
The LHCWA differs from a “seaman’s” cause of action in that
it is a true Worker’s Compensation Scheme.142 An injured employee
seeking recovery under the LHWCA is entitled to a scheduled
amount of compensation based upon their pay rate.143 The LHWCA
scheduled amounts are far lower than the damages a Jones Act
seaman could expect in negligence claim.144 The LHWCA is an
administrative scheme under the Department of Labor with internal adjudications before reaching the Circuit Courts of Appeal.145
However, the LHWCA does have a peculiar negligence feature in section 905(b).146 This section allows a non-seaman to sue
a “vessel” that she is injured upon in negligence.147 Yet again, the
“vessel” distinction becomes relevant.148
Section 905(b) negligence is not the same as Jones Act
negligence. “Vessels” owe a harbor worker only certain limited duties as laid out by the Supreme Court in Scindia Steam Navigation
Co. v. De Los Santos.149 These so-called Scindia duties are limited
to (1) the Turnover Duty; (2) the Active Control Duty; and (3) the
Duty to Intervene.150 In all, they are somewhat related to premises
See id. § 2:1, at 4, § 2:3, at 6–7.
See generally N.Y. WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW (McKinney 1922).
140 43 U.S.C. § 1333(b) (2018).
141 Id.
142 See FORCE & NORRIS, MARITIME PERSONAL INJURIES, supra note 135, § 2:1
at 4.
143 See id. § 6:6, at 26.
144 See FORCE & NORRIS, supra note 37, § 6:7.
145 See FORCE & NORRIS, MARITIME PERSONAL INJURIES, supra note 135,
§§ 6:7, at 26–27, § 6:8, at 35.
146 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (2018).
147 See id.
148 See id.
149 Manson Gulf, LLC v. Modern Am. Recycling Serv., 878 F.3d 130, 134
(5th Cir. 2017) (enumerating the Scindia duties). See generally Scindia Steam
Nav. Co. v. De Los Santos, 451 U.S. 156 (1982).
150 See Manson Gulf, 878 F.3d at 134.
138
139
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liability concepts,151 requiring the “vessel” to notify the harbor
worker of any latent hazards and to intervene when the harbor
worker is a risk.152
II.THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF LANDS ACT
A. History of Drilling on the OCS
Offshore drilling first appeared in Summerland, California,
just down the coast from Santa Barbara in the late nineteenth
century.153 Unlike the freestanding (or free-floating) rigs of today,
the oil drillers built piers a few hundred yards into the ocean and
built oil derricks thereupon.154 It was not until 1937 that the Pure
Oil and Superior Oil Company built the first freestanding oil rig
in the Gulf of Mexico.155 It stood in only 14 feet of water.156 Currently, approximately 1,862 oil rigs operate in the Gulf.157
B. Development of the OCSLA
Ownership of the seabed (and the resources thereunder)
was initially decided judicially in the 1947 case United States v.
California.158 California argued that it had control of the seabed
extending three miles from the coast.159 Core to the dispute was
the right to the oil under the seabed.160 The Court held that the
federal government, not California, owned this three mile band.161
In response, Congress passed the Submerged Lands Act (SLA)162
Scindia, 451 U.S. at 161–63.
See id.
153 OCS Lands Act History, BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., https://
www.boem.gov/OCS-Lands-Act-History/ [https://perma.cc/3N8P-2QRP].
154 NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND
OFFSHORE DRILLING, The History of Offshore Oil and Gas in the United States
1 (Staff Working Paper No. 22, 2011).
155 Id. at 1–2.
156 Id.
157 How Many Platforms are in the Gulf of Mexico?, BUREAU OF SAFETY & ENV’T
ENF’T, https://www.bsee.gov/faqs/how-many-platforms-are-in-the-gulf-of-mexico
[https://perma.cc/RU2A-485W].
158 United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 38–39 (1947).
159 Id.
160 Id. at 24–25.
161 Id. at 38–39.
162 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301–15 (2012).
151
152
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in 1953.163 In effect, Congress reversed the 1947 decision and
granted the three-mile belt to the states.164 In turn, all seabed
extending beyond those three miles was federal.165 This area is
designated as the Outer Continental Shelf.166
Alongside the SLA, Congress passed the OCSLA.167 The
OCSLA applied federal law168 to the Outer Continental Shelf.169
Reflecting the interest in oil disputed in United States v. California,170 the statute states that federal law applies to:
the subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf and to
all artificial islands and fixed structures which may be erected
thereon for the purpose of exploring for, developing, removing,
and transporting resources therefrom, to the same extent as if
the outer Continental Shelf were an area of exclusive Federal
jurisdiction located within a State.171

The original act envisions drilling rigs as enclaves of federal
law sitting in the middle of the ocean.172 Yet, confusingly, this would
suggest that the general maritime law could apply given that it is
federal common law.173 Fifth Circuit Judge DeMoss argues this was
not the case in his reasoned dissent in Demette v. Falcon Drilling
Co.174 Judge DeMoss notes that the Supreme Court rejected this
163 Submerged Lands Act, BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., https://
www.boem.gov/sites/default/files/uploadedFiles/BOEM/Oil_and_Gas_Energy_Pro
gram/Leasing/Outer_Continental_Shelf/Lands_Act_History/submerged.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LH54-KSSF].
164 OCS Lands Act History, BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., https://
www.boem.gov/OCS-Lands-Act-History/ [https://perma.cc/3N8P-2QRP].
165 Id. Under international maritime law, the OCS is understood to extend
outward 200 nautical miles—roughly 230 statute miles. Convention on the
Law of the Sea art. 76, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397.
166 43 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012).
167 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331–1356b (2018).
168 “The Constitution and laws and civil and political jurisdiction of the
United States ....” § 1333(a)(1).
169 Id.
170 See United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 24–25 (1947).
171 Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, Pub. L. No. 83-212, § 4(a)(1) 67 Stat.
642 (1953) (prior to 1978 amendment).
172 See id.
173 See supra text accompanying notes 23–24; SCHOENBAUM, 3d ed., supra
note 22, § 4-1, at 146. But see Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938)
(“There is no federal general common law.”)
174 See generally Demette v. Falcon Drilling Co., 280 F.3d 492, 504–19 (5th
Cir. 2002) (DeMoss, J., dissenting).
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application of Maritime law in Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty and
Surety Co., interpreting the statute as intentionally excluding
admiralty law.175 The Court stated,
The [OCSLA] makes it clear that federal law, supplemented by
state law of the adjacent State, is to be applied to these artificial
islands as though they were federal enclaves in an upland State.
This approach was deliberately taken in lieu of treating the structures as vessels, to which admiralty law supplemented by the
law of the jurisdiction of the vessel’s owner would apply ....176

Had Congress disagreed with this interpretation, it could
have amended the language of the OCSLA in the Act’s 1978 amendment to explicitly apply the general maritime law to drilling
rigs.177 Yet the only amendments to the relevant section extended
the application of the OCSLA, by striking “and fixed structures”
and inserting “and all installations and other devices permanently or temporarily attached to the seabed.”178 The committee
reports demonstrate that Congress intended this alteration to
bring floating rigs under the OCSLA.179 The report stated:
The committee intends that Federal law is, therefore, to be applicable to activities on drilling ships, semi-submersible drilling
rigs, and other watercraft, when they are connected to the seabed by drillstring, pipes, or other appurtenances, on the OCS
for exploration, development, or production purposes. Ships and
vessels are specifically not covered when they are being used
for the purpose of transporting OCS mineral resources.180

OCSLA intends for federal law, excluding admiralty and
the general maritime law, to apply to drilling rigs engaged in
OCS exploration.181 Indeed Congress went a step further, stating
Rodrigue v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 395 U.S. 352, 355 (1969); see Demette,
280 F.3d at 505 (DeMoss, J., dissenting).
176 Rodrigue, 395 U.S. at 355 (emphasis added).
177 See Demette, 280 F.3d at 507–08 (DeMoss, J., dissenting).
178 See Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 95372, § 203(a)(1), 92 Stat. 629 (1978). Congress also added language meant to
exclude vessels carrying resources to and from rigs. Id. § 203(a)(2).
179 H.R. REP. NO. 95-590, at 128 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1450, 1534.
180 Id. (emphasis added).
181 Rodrigue, 395 U.S. at 355; see supra text accompanying note 175; see
also Demette, 280 F.3d at 505, 507–08 (DeMoss, J., dissenting).
175
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that it intends for the OCSLA, and accordingly, its importation of
the LHWCA, to apply to “ships” in addition to self-propelled drilling
rigs when they are engaged in drilling.182 Thus, any structure
engaged in OCS exploration—regardless of “vessel” status—is
subject to the OCSLA, the LHWCA, and other federal law, but not
the general maritime law or admiralty jurisdiction.183
C. Application of the OCSLA
But the courts continually do not acknowledge this congressional directive.184 It is unclear why these courts do not delve
into the OCSLA’s statutory language, but a pair of statements
from the Supreme Court and the Fifth Circuit may provide some
light.185 In Stewart v. Dutra Construction Co.,186 a pre-Lozman
“vessel” case that the Lozman court did not overturn,187 Justice
Thomas wrote, “[A] watercraft [does not] pass in and out of Jones
Act coverage depending on whether it was moving at the time of
the accident.”188 Likewise, in rejecting Judge DeMoss’s argument
that a jack-up rig is not a “vessel” when engaged in drilling under
the OCSLA, the Fifth Circuit resorted to history and tradition in
182 H.R. REP. NO. 95-590, at 177 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1450, 1534.
183 Where federal law fails to provide an answer to a legal question, the
court may resort to the law of the adjacent state. Rodrigue, 395 U.S. at 355. This
creates other legal issues beyond the scope of this Note. For a recent case concerning the choice between applying state wage law or federal wage law on an
OCS drilling rig see generally Parker Drilling Mgmt. Servs. v. Newton, 139 S.
Ct. 1881 (2019).
184 See Demette v. Falcon Drilling Co., 280 F.3d 492, 503–04 (5th Cir. 2002)
overruled on other grounds by Grand Isle Shipyard, Inc. v. Seacor Marine,
LLC, 589 F.3d 778 (5th Cir. 2009).
185 Stewart v. Dutra Constr. Co., 543 U.S. 481, 495 (2005).
186 Id.
187 Lozman v. Riviera Beach, 568 U.S. 115, 123 (2013) (“The Court’s reasoning in Stewart also supports our conclusion.”). While Lozman is controlling,
the courts within the Fifth Circuit tend to cite to Stewart, in its cases concerning
“vessel” status and drilling rigs. Baker v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs,
834 F.3d 542, 546 (5th Cir. 2016); Warrior Energy Servs. Corp. v. ATP Titan
M/V, 551 Fed. Appx. 749, 751–52 (5th Cir. 2015); Ross v. W&T Offshore, Inc.,
357 F. Supp. 3d 554, 562–63 (E.D. La. 2018).
188 Stewart, 543 U.S. at 495 (holding that a dredge is a “vessel”).
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stating that, “Tinkering with the maritime definition of vessel
would overturn a centuries-old understanding of what constitutes
a vessel.”189
But these statements ignore Congress’s power to define
precisely what a “vessel” is and what effects that definition has.190
While Congress may have intended admiralty jurisdiction and
the general maritime law to apply to those injured by harms
arising from a “vessel,”191 Congress created a carve-out in the
OCSLA: even the clearest image of a “vessel,” a ship that has
stopped moving to engage in OCS drilling operations, has moved
out of maritime law coverage.192 Leges posteriores, priores contrarias abrogant—subsequent laws abrogate conflicting prior
laws.193 In the language and history of the OCSLA Congress
made its intent unquestionable—it intends for all structures engaged in OCS drilling to be treated as federal land.194 Allowing
injuries on self-propelled drilling rigs to proceed as Jones Act
claims violates the OCSLA.195
III.CREATING A CONSISTENT SYSTEM
Is a rig worker engaged in drilling activities a “seaman”?
The first question is whether the rig is a “vessel” or not.196 If it
is, all signs suggest an emphatic “yes.”197 The rig worker has a
Demette, 280 F.3d at 498 n.18.
See 1 U.S.C. § 3 (2019); 46 U.S.C. § 30101(a) (2019).
191 See 46 U.S.C. § 30101(a).
192 H.R. REP. NO. 95-590, at 128 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1450, 1534.
193 See Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 285 (1981) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“If
two inconsistent acts be passed at different times, the last ... is to be obeyed; and
if obedience cannot be observed without derogating from the first, it is the first
which must give way.” (citations omitted)).
194 Rodrigue v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 395 U.S. 352, 355 (1969); see supra
text accompanying note 181; see also Demette, 280 F.3d at 505, 507–08 (DeMoss,
J., dissenting).
195 See Ross v. W & T Offshore, Inc., 357 F. Supp. 3d 554, 562–63 (E.D. La.
2018).
196 See Grand Isle Shipyard Inc. v. Seacor Marine, LLC, 589 F.3d 784 (5th Cir.
2009) (“[I]f the tort occurs on navigable water instead of a fixed platform (or other
structure attached to the seabed), the OCSLA situs requirement is not met.”).
197 See Becker v. Tidewater, Inc., 335 F.3d 376, 391 (5th Cir. 2003); Grand
Isle Shipyard, 589 F.3d at 784.
189
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significant connection to the vessel because he is assigned to it, living on it as a crewmember would, and the worker contributes to
the vessel’s mission—that being drilling for oil or natural gas.198
But if the rig is not a “vessel,” then there is no option to find the
rig worker to be a “seaman.”199
But this conflicts with apparent Congressional intent.200
Congress specified that the LHWCA should extend to all fixtures
“permanently or temporarily attached to the seabed” for the purpose of exploring for, developing, “or producing resources therefrom ....”201
The current scheme means rig workers have different
causes of actions and remedies available to them based on the type
of rig they are on.202 Moreover, employers have varying levels of
liability based on the types of rigs they use.203 For uniformity
reasons and predictability for businesses and their employees,204
this scenario should not exist.
By creating a federal maritime common law, the intent was
to create uniformity for maritime transport across the country.205
Placing drilling rigs partially under maritime law in certain instances conflicts with this purpose.206 Following Lozman, courts
have two options to apply a uniform system for drilling rigs: (1)
Find self-propelled rigs to be non-vessels, bringing their employees
under the LHWCA;207 or (2) follow the rationale of Judge DeMoss
in Demette and clear congressional intent by applying the
OCSLA to all structures engaged in OCS drilling, regardless of
“vessel” status.208
See Becker, 335 F.3d at 387 (citing Chandris v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347,
368 (1995)).
199 Id.
200 See 43 U.S.C. § 1333 (a)(1) (2012).
201 Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 95-372,
§§ 203(a)(1)–(2), 92 Stat. 629 (1978).
202 See supra Sections I.B, I.C.
203 See id.
204 See The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. 558, 575 (1874).
205 Id. (“[T]he Constitution must have referred to a system of law coextensive with, and operating uniformly in, the whole country.” (emphasis added)).
206 See id.
207 See supra Section I.B.1.
208 See Demette, 280 F.3d at 506–08 (DeMoss, J., dissenting).
198
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A. Drilling Rigs Are Not “Vessels” Under Lozman
The Supreme Court created a more restrictive test for “vessel” status in Lozman.209 The Court laid out a list of factors that
are all relevant to the examination, but no one factor—including
propulsion—is dispositive.210 In the years since Lozman, courts
have found numerous types of rigs are not vessels under the
Lozman analysis.211 Yet, self-propelled rigs continue to escape
Lozman analysis.212
Two types of rigs are relevant: jack-up rigs and semisubmersibles.213 Semi-submersibles use propulsion to stay floating over their drilling location and can move short distances on
their own.214 Jack-up rigs function like a ship until they “jack
up” on stilts.215
Applying Lozman to these rigs, it is important to look at
how the Court described Fane Lozman’s home.216 The Court
made clear that floating and propulsion are not determinative
elements but rather only factors.217 The Court further considered the outward appearance of the home, remarking it looked
more homelike than it did ship-like.218 The Court found the
home’s outward appearance to be so important to the analysis
that the Court attached an image of the home to the opinion.219
Reading this description in conjunction with the Court’s
“reasonable observer” test of whether a structure was intended
to carry people or things over water, it becomes clear that the
court is asking a simple question: does the structure look like
and function like a traditional ship?220 Mr. Lozman’s home did
not, and nor does a self-propelled drilling rig.221
See Maass, supra note 75, at 906; Lozman v. Riviera Beach, 568 U.S. 115,
121 (2013).
210 Lozman, 568 U.S. at 127–28.
211 See supra Section I.B.1.
212 See supra text accompanying notes 91–98.
213 See id.
214 Sadeghi, supra note 78, at 3.
215 See supra text accompanying notes 98–99.
216 Lozman v. Riviera Beach, 568 U.S. 115, 121 (2013).
217 See id.; Maass, supra note 75, at 907.
218 Lozman, 568 U.S. at 122.
219 Id. at 132–33.
220 See id.
221 See id.
209
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The Fifth Circuit has incorrectly suggested otherwise.222 In
Warrior Energy, the Fifth Circuit fixed upon the Lozman Court’s
approval of Stewart v. Dutra Construction Co.223 in which the
Supreme Court found that a crewed dredge was a “vessel.”224 While
the ATP Titan was a spar and the court eventually ruled it not a
“vessel,”225 it misapplies Lozman’s “reasonable observer” test.
Drilling rigs look nothing like a traditional ship.226 Under
Lozman, the courts should look at self-propelled rigs, much like
Mr. Lozman’s home on a barge.227 It does not look like it is meant to
actually carry people or things over water for the purpose of
maritime commerce.228 This is an oil derrick placed upon a floating platform that has some limited movement ability. Moreover,
they tend to be affixed to the seabed for long periods like a spar.229
Applying this reasoning, the courts could do away with the split
between fixed and self-propelled rigs because excluding selfpropelled rigs as “vessels” would mean they would clearly be
treated as artificial islands under the OCSLA.230
B. Congressional Intent and Supreme Court Precedent Deem
Admiralty Inapplicable to Offshore Drilling
Notwithstanding “vessel” status, Congressional intent is
clear that structures engaged in drilling on the OCS are not within
the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States, nor can the general
maritime law apply.231 Judge DeMoss’s dissent in Demette provides
See Warrior Energy Servs. Corp. v. ATP Titan M/V, 551 Fed. Appx.
749, 751–52 (5th Cir. 2015); Stewart v. Dutra Constr. Co., 543 U.S. 481, 484,
494–95 (2005).
223 Warrior, 551 Fed. Appx. 751–52.
224 Stewart, 543 U.S. 484, 494–95.
225 Warrior, 551 Fed. Appx. at 752.
226 See Sadeghi, supra note 78, at 2–4.
227 See Lozman v. Riviera Beach, 568 U.S. 115, 121–22. See generally
Sadeghi, supra note 78, at 2–4.
228 Lozman, 568 U.S. at 121–22; see also The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. 558, 575
(1874) (“It certainly could not have been the intention to place the rules and limits
of maritime law under the disposal and regulation of the several States, as
that would have defeated the uniformity and consistency at which the Constitution aimed on all subjects of a commercial character ....” (emphasis added)).
229 Sadeghi, supra note 78, at 3.
230 Rodrigue v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 395 U.S. 352, 355 (1969).
231 See supra Section I.A.1.
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an in-depth history of the OCSLA and the legislative intent
therein.232 The original act and its 1978 amendment, read in
conjunction with the Supreme Court’s intervening interpretation
of the original act, provide a strong argument that Congress intended to exclude admiralty from applying to all structures engaged in offshore drilling.233
The Fifth Circuit may already be moving in this direction,
but in a confusing manner based on shaky logic.234 In Barker v.
Hercules Offshore, Inc., the court interpreted the OCSLA as applying to a jack-up rig—a “vessel.”235 The Fifth Circuit held that a
welder killed while supporting drilling activities did not have a
maritime tort claim because drilling activities are not sufficiently
maritime under Grubart.236 The court noted Judge DeMoss’s dissent in Demette, agreeing that Congress intended to exclude
admiralty from OCS drilling.237 Yet the Fifth Circuit created an
exception for admiralty to apply if a tort could meet the Grubart
test.238
Two problems malign the underlying logic. First, the court
continued the Fifth Circuit’s insistence that the general maritime
law applies in OCSLA situses.239 The Court cited to Tennessee Gas
Pipeline v. Houston Casualty Insurance Co. and Smith v. Penrod
Drilling Corp.240 The most recent case, Tennessee Gas, suggested
that section 1332(2) was intended to preserve maritime laws’
applicability to the OCS.241 Section 1332(2) states: “this subchapter
shall be construed in such a manner that the character of the
See Demette v. Falcon Drilling Co., 280 F.3d 492, 504–19 (5th Cir.
2002) (DeMoss, J., dissenting); supra Section II.B.
233 Demette, 280 F.3d at 504–19; see supra Section II.B.
234 See infra text accompanying notes 235–38.
235 Barker v. Hercules Offshore, Inc., 713 F.3d 208, 215 (5th Cir. 2013).
236 Id. at 217–18.
237 Id. at 216–17.
238 Compare id., with Rodrigue v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 395 U.S. 352, 366
(1969).
239 Barker, 713 F.3d at 218–19 (citing Tennessee Gas Pipeline v. Houston
Cas. Ins., 87 F.3d 150, 154 (5th Cir. 1996) (“While [the] OCSLA was intended
to apply to the full range of disputes that might occur on the OCS, it was not
intended to displace general maritime law.”); Smith v. Penrod Drilling Corp.,
960 F.2d 456, 459 (5th Cir. 1992).
240 Barker, 713 F.3d at 213–14.
241 Tennessee Gas, 87 F.3d at 154.
232
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waters above the Outer Continental Shelf as high seas and the
right to navigation and fishing therein shall not be affected.”242
On its face, the section is meant to clarify that the OCSLA’s situs
does not extend ad coelum (or perhaps more appropriately ad
mare) but rather is constrained to the seabed and those items attached to it.243 This understanding is even more apparent when
section 1332(2) is read in conjunction with section 1333(a)(1).244 In
short, the Fifth Circuit misses the impetus of the OCSLA: the holding in United States v. California, which concerned control and
regulation of the seabed, not water above it.245
The reliance on Smith is misplaced as well. A common question outside the scope of this Note is when state law will supplement or supplant federal law under the OCSLA.246 The test
for the application of state law under the OCSLA is (1) OCS situs;
(2) the general maritime law does not apply in its own force; and
(3) the state law is not inconsistent with federal law.247 But this
is simply a recitation of the supremacy of the general maritime
law over state law in a conflict of laws analysis.248 If a non-OCS,
maritime claim goes into a district court sitting in diversity, the
general maritime law takes precedence over any state law.249 Thus,
if an OCS tort ((1) OCS situs) occurs in a manner that satisfies
Grubart ((2) maritime law applies in its own force), then under the
standard choice of law analysis, the general maritime law is applied.250 Therefore, the Fifth Circuit reliance on Smith as holding that the OCSLA does not preclude the general maritime law
is an incomplete statement.251 The OCSLA will incorporate the
43 U.S.C. § 1332(2) (2018).
Id.
244 Compare id., with 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(1) (2018) (“[Federal laws] are extended to the subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf ....”).
245 See supra text accompanying notes 158–78.
246 See supra text accompanying note 183.
247 Union Tex. Petrol. Corp. v. PLT Eng’g, Inc., 895 F.2d 1043, 1047 (5th
Cir. 1990).
248 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
249 Gibbs ex rel. Gibbs v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 314 F.3d 125, 132 (3d Cir.
2002); SCHOENBAUM, 3d ed., supra note 22, § 4-3, at 156 (“[The general maritime law], when in conflict with state law, is supreme.”).
250 See Union Texas, 895 F.2d at 1047; Gibbs, 314 F.3d at 132.
251 Gibbs, 314 F.3d at 132.
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general maritime law if there is a maritime tort (1) on an OCS situs;
(2) that federal law does not cover, and (3) satisfies Grubart, such as
an allision with a rig.252
Notwithstanding the flawed interpretation of the OCSLA,
the Fifth Circuit improperly found that under the OCSLA the
Grubart maritime tort test allows for finding maritime torts on a rig
engaged in drilling.253 The court relied on precedent holding drilling
activities were not a traditional maritime activity, suggesting only
a status question and not a situs question for the OCSLA.254 This
risks creating confusion that could result in the absurd scenario
that if a rig is a “vessel” and an accident occurs, then maritime
law is appropriate because it occurred on a “vessel” in navigation, once again circumventing the intent of the OCSLA.255
The Rodrigue court’s language that rigs should be treated
as “federal enclaves in an upland [s]tate” should be guiding.256
Rigs are in effect islands or land.257 Thus under the OCSLA, maritime torts only occur on rigs when the admiralty extension act
applies through Grubart.258 By way of reminder, under Grubart
for a tort on “land” to be maritime there must be: (1) a traditional
maritime activity nexus; and (2) the harm was caused by a vessel on navigable waters.259 Therefore, the only apparent way for
a tort on a rig engaged in drilling to be maritime is when a ship
allides with the rig.260
Drilling activities are non-maritime.261 Therefore, so long
as a drilling accident is not caused by a third party vessel, the
See Union Texas, 895 F.2d at 1047; Gibbs, 314 F.3d at 132.
Barker v. Hercules Offshore, Inc., 713 F.3d 208, 217–18 (5th Cir. 2013).
254 See id.
255 See H.R. REP. No. 95-590, at 128 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1450, 1534.
256 See Rodrigue v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 395 U.S. 352, 355 (1969).
257 Id. (“The [OCSLA] makes it clear that federal law, supplemented by
state law of the adjacent State, is to be applied to these artificial islands as
though they were federal enclaves in an upland State.” (emphasis added)).
258 See 46 U.S.C. § 30101(a) (2018).
259 See Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513
U.S. 527, 535–36 (1995); De La Rosa v. St. Charles Gaming Co., 474 F.3d 185,
187 (5th Cir. 2006).
260 See Grubart, 513 U.S. at 535–36; De La Rosa, 474 F.3d at 187; see also
supra text accompanying note 259.
261 Herb’s Welding, Inc. v. Gray, 470 U.S. 414, 422 (1985).
252
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Grubart analysis does not apply.262 It is as if the accident occurred
in some “upland [s]tate,”263 or better put, an island.264 Congress
decided to apply the LHWCA to all apparatuses engaged in drilling through the OCSLA.265 Because admiralty cannot apply under
Grubart combined with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the
OCSLA under Rodrigue,266 lower courts should not apply maritime law to torts occurring on drilling rigs engaged in mineral
exploration, but rather apply the LHWCA267 to such accidents.
CONCLUSION
Maritime law attempts to create harmony in the law from
the Atlantic to the Pacific.268 The purpose is to promote maritime
commerce by creating certainty for those who would engage in
the market.269 But a two-headed hydra has arisen in the offshore
drilling industry.270 Some rigs are “vessels,” exposing employers
to maritime liability under the Jones Act, while others are not,
exposing employers to the LHWCA’s workers’ compensation
scheme.271 This creates uncertainty not only in the drilling industry but future OCS related industries that may develop such
as wind and solar farming.272
If an employee is injured on an apparatus exploring the
OCS, there should not be a question of whether the apparatus is
a “vessel” or what type of work the employee is engaged in. For the
sake of uniformity and predictability, there should be a simple
See Grubart, 513 U.S. at 535–36; Herb’s Welding, Inc., 470 U.S. at 422;
see also De La Rosa, 474 F.3d at 187.
263 Rodrigue v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 395 U.S. 352, 355 (1969).
264 Id. (referring to drilling rigs as “artificial islands”).
265 H.R. REP. NO. 95-590, at 128 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1450, 1534; see also Demette v. Falcon Drilling Co., 280 F.3d 492, 504–08 (5th
Cir. 2002) (DeMoss, J., dissenting).
266 See supra text accompanying notes 256–62.
267 43 U.S.C. § 1333(b) (2018).
268 See The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. 558, 575 (1874).
269 Id.
270 See supra Section I.B.1.
271 See supra Sections I.B.1, I.C.
272 Renewable Energy on the Outer Continental Shelf, BUREAU OF OCEAN
ENERGY MGMT., https://www.boem.gov/renewable-energy/renewable-energy-pro
gram-overview [https://perma.cc/97TG-QTVG].
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answer. Congress decided to provide one with the OCSLA.273
Congress intended for all drilling work to fall under the OCSLA,
notwithstanding “vessel” status. Therefore all employee injuries
are to be treated under the LHWCA.274 Thus, employers have a
simple, predictable scheme for their liability to employee injuries.275
But courts have continually failed to apply the OCSLA in this
manner, electing to default to history, creating inconsistency in
maritime law.276 While the simple answer would be to simply apply
the OCSLA as Congress intended, the courts now have the option of
redefining self-propelled rigs as non-“vessels” under Lozman.277
Whichever way the courts choose to proceed, they must keep in
mind the purpose of admiralty jurisdiction, to promote maritime
commerce, even if that means excluding a deep sea drilling rig
from that system.278

See supra Section II.B.
See supra Part II.
275 See supra Section I.C.3.
276 See supra Sections II.C, I.B.1.
277 See supra Section I.B, Part III.
278 H.R. REP. NO. 95-590, at 128 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1450, 1534.
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